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OF RESCUE AND REPORT: SHOULD TORT LAW
IMPOSE A DUTY TO HELP ENDANGERED
PERSONS OR ABUSED CHILDREN?
Marc A. Franklin* & Matthew Ploeger**
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay explores whether a civil duty to rescue' should
be imposed on a person who has the apparent ability to save
another person or to prevent that person from entering a po-
sition of peril.2 It also examines the related question of
* Frederick I. Richman Professor, Stanford Law School. LL.B., Cornell
Law School; A.B., Cornell University. A version of this essay was presented at
the Santa Clara Law Review Symposium, Law, Ethics, and the Good Samari-
tan, held at Santa Clara University School of Law on March 24, 2000.
** J.D. candidate, Stanford Law School; Ph.D., University of Texas at Aus-
tin; M.A., University of Texas at Austin; B.A., University of Texas at Austin.
1. Whether the proposed duty to rescue has been framed in terms of crimi-
nal law, see, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About
"Bad Samaritan" Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (2000), or civil law, it has
always been framed in terms of "easy" rescue. For various attempts to define
"easy" rescue, see Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder
to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 25
(1993) (questioning what easy rescue means and finding the statutes ambiguous
and that no courts have addressed the issue); Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment,
No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the Street?
What Is Left of the American Rule, and Will it Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L.
REV. 353, 368 (1999) ("An easy rescue is one where a victim is in danger and a
potential rescuer is in a position to alleviate the harm without any significant
cost to himself."); Sungeeta Jain, Note, How Many People Does it Take to Save a
Drowning Baby?: A Good Samaritan Statute in Washington State, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 1181, 1189 (1999) (defining "easy rescues" as those that "involve no danger
to the rescuer and do not interfere with duties the rescuer owes to others").
2. Although this symposium focuses on situations in which immediate ac-
tion is required, we will range more broadly, considering cases and statutes that
address situations more remote in time and space from the typical "rescue"-
though they may involve more lives. For example, one person may mislead
others to the detriment of still others. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified
Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997) (examining instance when employment refer-
ences that were silent about prior predatory conduct led school district to hire
man who assaulted student). See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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whether a civil duty to report child abuse should be imposed.
A government that can achieve a result by offering incentives
and encouragement should take that route rather than man-
dating action. If that course does not achieve the desired re-
sult, then the government must face the question of whether
a command is appropriate. In that spirit, Part II of this essay
reviews the existing incentives in the rescue situation. Part
III turns to the arguments for and against imposing a civil
duty of easy rescue. It concludes that, given the existing in-
centives and the arguments against the civil duty, no such
duty should be imposed. Part IV then asks whether the
analysis retains its force in states that adopt a criminal duty
to rescue. It also considers the impact of legislation that re-
quires those who are at the scene of a crime or who believe
that child abuse has occurred to report this information to
police or other authorities. It concludes, finally, that the case
for a civil duty of easy rescue has not been established, but
that the case for a civil duty to report child abuse is a much
closer question.
II. CIVIL INCENTIVES TO RESCUE OR AID
The story of the Good Samaritan is one that resonates
deeply in the United States. In recognition, state and federal
governments have created a broad array of incentives to en-
courage rescues. This section identifies the most important of
these incentives in an attempt to gauge whether the cluster of
incentives is adequate to the situation-whether taken to-
gether these incentives might render unnecessary the crea-
tion of a duty to rescue. These incentives fall into two major
categories: (1) alleviating the loss to rescuers who are injured
while attempting rescues, and (2) protecting those who are
sued because of events occurring during their attempts to res-
cue or render aid. Governments offering incentives have not
limited either type of incentive to the easy rescue situation.
A. Encouraging Conduct by Aiding Those Hurt While Trying
to Help Others
1. Legislation
Perhaps the most common statutes in this category are
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found in the universal state legislative schemes that compen-
sate victims of violent crime.3 These statutes generally ex-
tend coverage to rescuers who are injured while trying to pro-
tect or rescue crime victims.4 Although some of these statutes
limit recovery to victims who demonstrate need or serious fi-
nancial hardship,' rescuers need not meet that condition.6
These statutes generally treat rescuers more generously than
they do victims.7 This may be seen as an effort to encourage
rescue in a statute that is not otherwise concerned with in-
ducing conduct. A related approach singles out rescuers for
compensation if they are injured while trying to rescue.8
2. Common Law
Common law doctrines treat rescuers more favorably
than they treat victims. The courts often establish a tortfea-
sor's duty not only to the victim, but also to rescuers at-
tempting to aid the victim. The most famous example is
3. See Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the Compensation
of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 334
& n.8 (1994) ("By 1992,... every state had enacted a compensation program.").
In 1984, Congress enacted the Victims of Crimes Acts, establishing the Crime
Victims Fund, which provided additional funding for state crime victim compen-
sation programs. See Victims of Crimes Acts, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
4. See Greer, supra note 3, at 349.
5. See id. at 368-70; see also, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney
1999).
6. See Greer, supra note 3, at 351 & nn.90-91, 369 n.183; see also, e.g.,
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(5)(c).
7. See Greer, supra note 3, at 351 & n.91, 369 n.183; see also, e.g., N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 631(5)(b) & (c) (exempting Good Samaritans from provisions that
reduce the amount of awards based on contributory conduct and allowing Good
Samaritans to recovery for property damage).
8. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13970 (West 1999). In addition, some
states formally encourage heroic behavior on the part of prisoners by rewarding
such conduct. Idaho allows the director of the department of corrections to re-
duce the sentence of a prisoner who performs "an extraordinary act of heroism
at the risk of his own life or for outstanding service to the state of Idaho which
results in the saving of lives, prevention of destruction or major property loss
during a riot, or the prevention of an escape from a correctional facility." IDAHO
CODE § 20-101D (1986). For example, two prisoners at a work camp in Idaho
recently risked their lives in an unsuccessful attempt to save a driver who had
crashed his car into a canal. Under the Idaho law, they may' petition the direc-
tor for reductions in their sentences. See 2 Prisoners May Get Time Cut for
Heroism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at A18. To similar effect, Iowa allows for the
restoration of previously revoked good conduct time in recognition of heroism.
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 903A.3 (West 1998).
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Wagner v. International Railway Co.,' in which the plaintiff
was injured while searching in the dark for his cousin who
had fallen from defendant's train due to the negligence of the
crew. Judge Cardozo responded to the argument that the de-
fendant owed no duty of care to the rescuer with the famous
passage: "Danger invites rescue .... The wrong that imperils
life is a wrong to the imperiled victim, it is a wrong also to his
rescuer.... The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the com-
ing of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had."" Moreo-
ver, courts extended this notion by eliminating the require-
ment that the danger imperil a third party. A defendant who
is careless for his or her own safety will be liable if that con-
duct leads to the injury of a rescuer at the scene."
The desirability of rescues has also been recognized in a
line of cases imposing tort liability against those who negli-
gently" or intentionally"3 interfere with attempted rescues.
9. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
10. Id. at 437-38.
11. See Sears v. Morrison, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
a defendant who negligently became trapped under a swamp cooler was liable to
the person who was injured while trying to rescue him); Carney v. Buyea, 65
N.Y.S.2d 902, 908-09 (App. Div. 1946) ("We think the defendant, by parking her
car as she did, exposed herself to undue risk .... Her act in that respect was
wrongful to the plaintiff since it brought about an undue risk of injury to him
causing him to undertake her rescue to his injury and damage."); see also F.
Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9, 30
n.33 (1925) ("[A] person who carelessly exposes himself to danger or who at-
tempts to take his life in a place where others may be expected to be, does com-
mit a wrongful act towards them in that it exposes them to a recognizable risk
of injury.").
12. See Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that a bartender had a duty to permit a third party to call the police to aid the
plaintiff); Griffith v. Southland Corp., 617 A.2d 598 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
(holding that a convenience store employee had a duty to call for police to aid a
police officer who was being assaulted outside the store). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states the law this way:
One who knows or has reason to know that a third person is giving or
is ready to give to another aid necessary to prevent physical harm to
him, and negligently prevents or disables the third person from giving
such aid, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the other by
the absence of the aid which he has prevented the third person from
giving.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 327 (1979).
13. See Riggs v. Colis, 695 P.2d 413 (Idaho 1985) (recognizing an action for
aiding and abetting assault and battery where defendant prevented, at knife
point, a bystander from intervening in an attack by a thrid party on the plain-
tiff); Barnes v. Dungan, 690 N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 1999) (recognizing a
wrongful death action alleging intentional interference with lifesaving medical
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In addition to helping rescuers establish duty, courts
have been reluctant to find rescuers contributorily negligent
for trying to rescue or for how they attempted the rescue.
During the era when contributory negligence was a complete
bar to recovery, 14 most courts protected rescuers by holding
that the conduct of a plaintiff rescuer could not be considered
contributorily negligent unless it reached the level of reck-
lessness. 5
The emergence of comparative negligence has led to ar-
guments that allegedly negligent rescuers no longer need the
benefits of the earlier rule barring consideration of a rescuer's
possibly negligent conduct. Opponents of the earlier rule ar-
gue that a rescuer's negligence should be straightforwardly
compared with the negligence that led to the need for rescue.
Although some courts have agreed, 6 at least one court has as-
serted that society still needs to encourage rescuers, and that
this goal may be furthered by retaining the earlier rule that
there was no contributory negligence to compare unless the
rescuer acted rashly or recklessly. 7
assistance where supervisor prevented worker from administering CPR to the
victim of a heart attack); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 ("One
who intentionally prevents a third person from giving to another aid necessary
to prevent physical harm to him, is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to the other by the absence of the aid which he has prevented the third person
from giving.").
14. Contributory negligence is still a complete bar in five jurisdictions (Ala-
bama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia).
15. See Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). There is a mi-
nority strain of opinions holding that a rescuer who knew the danger of the
situation, perhaps in entering a burning inhabited house, "assumed the risk" of
the resulting injury, freeing the defendant who negligently set the house on fire
from any liability to the rescuer. See id. at 505 (Allen, J., dissenting).
16. Most courts addressing this issue have focused on the fact that compara-
tive negligence removes the harsh consequences of contributory negligence and
have ruled that a plaintiff who is negligent in performing a rescue should re-
cover only a pro rata share of the damages sustained attributable to the defen-
dant. See, e.g., Zimny v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 513 A.2d 1235 (Conn. App. Ct.
1986); Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Sweetman v. State Highway Dep't, 357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984); Pachesky v. Getz, 510 A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Oullette v. Carde,
612 A.2d 687 (R.I. 1992).
17. See Oullette, 612 A.2d at 690. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
stated:
We are of the opinion, however, that the comparative-negligence doc-
trine does not fully protect the rescue doctrine's underlying policy of
promoting rescue. No common-law duties changed as a result of the
enactment of Rhode Island's comparative-negligence statute, and there
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3. Non-Governmental
Incentives to rescue may come from non-governmental
sources as well. The media provides extensive coverage of he-
roic acts," human caring, and, as in the Kitty Genovese case,
accounts of the failure of others to help someone in peril.19 In
addition, wealthy citizens and communities often arrange to
help caring people, heroes, or their survivors, for example by
creating college funds for their children."
B. Encouraging Conduct by Protecting Those Sued After
Trying to Help Others
In addition to helping persons hurt during their efforts to
rescue, the government also helps rescuers who are sued for
alleged misconduct during the rescue. Even though the gov-
ernment has not compelled the rescue,2 it nonetheless en-
courages such an effort by protecting rescuers against some
is nothing other than an individual's moral conscience to induce a per-
son under no legal duty to undertake a rescue attempt. The law places
a premium on human life, and one who voluntarily attempts to save a
life of another should not be barred from complete recovery. Only if a
person is rash or reckless in the rescue attempt should recovery be
limited; accordingly we hold that the rescue doctrine survives the adop-
tion of the comparative-negligence statute and that principles of com-
parative negligence apply only if a defendant establishes that the res-
cuer's actions were rash or reckless.
Id.
18. See, e.g., Rodney Foo, Teenager Saved from Rampage, Police Say, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 22, 2000, at 1B-2B (reporting on an incident in
which a man rescued a teenage girl from an attacker by wrestling him to the
ground and disarming him).
19. See Dressier, supra note 1, at 972 n.10 & 983 n.53. By definition, it is
difficult to identify situations where a rescue did not occur, since there is no
reason for those on the scene to publicize their behavior. Occasionally, as with
the Genovese case and the event that spurred this symposium, others do learn
about such conduct. There is no way to know how many of these go unreported.
On the other hand, some who address matters of decent behavior do espouse the
view that we are a nation of rescuers. See Ann Landers, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb.
17, 2000, at B9 (responding to a letter about strangers who saved the writer's
husband who had suffered heat stroke and a heart attack while jogging: "I never
cease to be amazed at the number of good Samaritans out there"). Media cover-
age of non-rescues has also led to legislation in Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Rhode Island, and Nevada. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamina-
tion and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 423 & n.3 (1985); see also
Dressler, supra note 1, at 973-74 n.15 (discussing proposed legislation after the
David Cash incident).
20. See, e.g., Sharyn Obsatz, Teen and Her Brother Aid Flood Victims with
$1,000, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Mar. 22, 2000, at B2.
21. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM
tort liability. Although some of these examples may not in-
volve imminent danger, they all involve situations in which
life and health are at stake.
The most widely known protection against lawsuits re-
flects the medical profession's successful efforts to obtain
greater protection when sued over the rendition of emergency
services in so-called "Good Samaritan" situations-those in
which no prior doctor-patient relationship exists and no re-
muneration is anticipated. Physicians claimed that fear of
being sued for less-than-perfect results in such situations in-
hibited them from stopping at roadside accidents and similar
emergencies to render aid. In response, legislation extending
such tort protection has been enacted in every jurisdiction.22
The resulting legislation protects physicians, and in some
cases other personnel,23 from liability unless their conduct is
found to be grossly negligent or worse.24 The lobbying effort
for tort protection of the medical profession took an unex-
pected turn in Vermont to produce the nation's first general
duty-to-rescue legislation.25
Closely related to the statutes protecting the medical pro-
fession are those that protect non-medical personnel who ad-
minister emergency assistance. These protections may be
based on the employment status of the person attempting the
aid, 6 his or her relationship to the victim,27 or explicitly on the
training the rescuer has had.28
22. See Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan
Laws-Who Needs Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in
the United States, 21 SO. TEX. L.J. 327, 327 (1980).
23. See id. at 331-38 (summarizing who is covered under the various stat-
utes).
24. See id. at 342-46 (summarizing the standard of care required to receive
immunity under the various statutes).
25. For a tracing of the history of the Vermont legislation, see Marc A.
Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972).
26. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 55A (West 1996) (protecting
school personnel who aid students); id. ch. 94, § 305D (restaurant employees
who aid choking patrons); id. ch. 111C, § 14 (emergency medical technicians,
police officers, and firefighters who aid anyone); id. ch. 112, § 12B (medical pro-
fessionals who volunteer emergency treatment); id. ch. 112, § 12C (physicians
and nurses who administer immunizations).
27. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 55A applies to school person-
nel who help students, and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 305D does not ap-
ply to restaurant employees who aid noncustomers.
28. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12V (applying to persons
trained in CPR who administer CPR); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.21 (West 1999)
(applying to persons trained in CPR or use of defibrillator who administer CPR
2000] 997
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An obscure but important example involves federal and
state efforts to encourage the donation of outdated, but still
edible, foods and crops. Americans annually discard ap-
proximately "[fourteen] billion pounds of food, a good portion
of which is still edible."29 Commercial sources of such food-
restaurants and processors-were apparently reluctant to do-
nate leftovers for fear of being sued if the food caused illness.
Congress and some states responded by extending protection
against tort suits. Congress provided that such suppliers
"shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from
the nature, age, packaging, or condition of apparently whole-
some food or an apparently fit grocery product that the [sup-
plier] donates in good faith to a nonprofit organization for ul-
timate distribution to needy individuals."' Coordinated
protection is extended to the nonprofit organizations distrib-
uting the food.31
Finally, protection against liability for defamation pro-
vides another example of how the government encourages
prosocial behavior. Before much of libel law was constitu-
tionalized, it was a system of strict liability relieved by quali-
fied (and occasionally absolute) privileges in situations in
which the state encouraged persons to speak. What resulted
was a series of qualified privileges for, among other things,32
reporting suspected crimes to law enforcement agencies," in-
ternal discussions among partners about the operation of a
business, 4 and responses of present or former employers to
requests from prospective employers for information about job
or use a defibrillator in an emergency).
29. Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1996, at C8.
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1791(c)(1) (West 1999).
31. See id. §1791(c)(2). California has sought to encourage food donation in
a different way. The donor of food that "is fit for human consumption at the
time it was donated to a nonprofit charitable organization" is protected from li-
ability "[e]xcept for injury resulting from negligence or a willful act." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714.25(a) (West 1998). This protection applies "regardless of compli-
ance with any laws, regulations or ordinances regulating the packaging or la-
beling of food . . . ." Id. The nonprofit organization, if it "in good faith, receives
and distributes food without charge that is fit for human consumption at the
time it was distributed is not liable for an injury or death due to the food unless
the injury or death is a direct result of the negligence, recklessness, or inten-
tional misconduct of the organization." Id. § 1714.25(b).
32. See generally ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION (3d ed. 1999).
33. See id. § 9.2.3.
34. See id. § 9.2.5.
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applicants.35 Without protection in these situations, essential
communications would have been inhibited. One striking ex-
ample is the report of a commercial airplane crash attributed
to a pilot who had recently worked for another airline. The
pilot "had resigned from [the first] airline to avoid being fired
for failing a critical flight test."36 The second airline did not
obtain that information from the first airline until after the
accident, and admitted that it would not share such informa-
tion about its own present or former pilots. Asserting fear of
libel suits, the second airline asked Congress for immunity for
airlines that share such information.
In sum, the government provides an impressive array of
incentives to rescue. Still, some may conclude that incentives
are inherently insufficient and that tort law should mandate
rescue. Part III addresses that contention.
35. See id. § 9.2.2.1.
36. Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon
Their "No Comment" Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1996).
37. See id. Note that the employer's desire to avoid libel claims by former
employees is reinforced by the desire to avoid suits brought by those hurt as the
result of an inaccurate reference. This may include those who directly rely on
the defendant's reference, as well as those hurt by the reliance of others.
In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, 929 P.2d 582 (Cal.
1997), for example, three defendant school districts placed in a central place-
ment file their reports on the same former employee. See id. at 585-86. The
reports consistently spoke highly of the employee and none of the three men-
tioned that during his stay in that district there had been charges or complaints
of sexual misconduct and impropriety with female students. See id. A fourth
school district hired the man in question, who then sexually assaulted the plain-
tiff-student in that district. See id. In the resulting suit, a unanimous court
concluded that, although the referring districts had no duty whatever to say
anything about the employee, once they undertook to do so they had a duty to
exercise reasonable care not to mislead. See id. Although defendants argued
that no such duty arose here because they had said nothing about sexual be-
havior in their reports, the court thought that the generally affirmative com-
ments about the employee might reasonably lead a reader to conclude that the
writer knew nothing that might discredit the employee. See id.
These concerns, which have not been much affected by the constitutionali-
zation, may be allayed only through government incentives or compulsion com-
bined with protection. As usual, the existence and nature of an incentive will
depend on the government's assessment of the importance of the desired con-
duct and what it will take to obtain that conduct.
The court in Randi W. asserted in dictum that the defendants were free to
say nothing. See id. at 589. On the other hand, the court in Tarasoff v. Regents
of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), hinted that it might have
been willing to impose a duty based on foreseeability alone if it had not found an
alternate basis. See id. at 342-43. Such an approach would assuredly result in
imposition of a duty to rescue.
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III. SHOULD A STATE IMPOSE A TORT DUTY TO RESCUE?
Tort liability should not be imposed unless that imposi-
tion can be justified on tort criteria. Even when a defendant's
undoubtedly careless conduct has harmed another, tort law
asks whether the defendant owed the plaintiff any duty not to
act in that manner." Courts face concerns that include un-
bounded and disproportionate liability, the impact of judg-
ments on defendants and society, the need to deter dangerous
conduct, the administrability of new claims in terms of num-
bers of suits and the nature of proof, and whether a new
damage claim can be effectively controlled. The oft-repeated
functions of tort law--compensation and deterrence-do not
apply in the duty-to-rescue area because they are usually in-
voked in cases in which a defendant's conduct caused the vic-
tim's plight. As tort law currently operates, courts must ini-
tially focus on whether the defendant's conduct warrants the
imposition of liability. Compensation, which focuses on the
plaintiff, comes into play only after a court concludes the de-
fendant's conduct warrants the imposition of a duty. Admit-
tedly, an emphasis on compensation would lead to more du-
ties than an emphasis on deterrence. If, however,
38. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §107 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In determining
whether to impose a duty, courts balance a number of considerations. See, e.g.,
J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998). In J.S., the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
In determining whether a duty is to be imposed, courts must engage in
a rather complex analysis that weighs and balances several, related
factors, including the nature of the underlying risk of harm, that is, its
foreseeability and severity, the opportunity and ability to exercise care
to prevent the harm, the comparative interests of, and the relation-
ships between or among, the parties, and, ultimately, based on consid-
erations of public policy and fairness, the societal interest in the pro-
posed solution.
Id. at 928. Similarly, the California Supreme Court, in Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), noted that determination of duty
involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones
are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting li-
ability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insur-
ance for the risk involved.
Id. at 564.
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compensation were the main focus, tort law would not subor-
dinate compensation nearly as often as it does.
This is not the occasion to reconsider the underlying na-
ture of duty in tort law. The point here is that tort law is al-
ready concerned with exposing defendants to liability in cases
in which their careless behavior has hurt others. Courts will
be even more uneasy about imposing duty in a case in which
the defendant has done absolutely nothing to create the
plaintiffs danger. Is there a need for rescues that justifies
the state telling its citizens not only to avoid carelessly hurt-
ing others, but also that they must affirmatively act in cer-
tain situations or risk extensive liability? 9
No civil court has ever demanded that one stranger res-
cue another. This essay does not suggest that tort law is in-
capable of development." Rather, it is important to identify
and make explicit the reasons underlying this failure to re-
quire rescue. Several justifications require discussion.41
First, the legislatures and courts may have concluded that
even where the incentives are inadequate, personal freedom
is more important than saving lives by mandating rescue.
Second, theory aside, governments may have concluded that
there is no need to mandate action-the incentives are work-
ing adequately. Third, tort law's sanctions are potentially
much more severe than those of the criminal law.42 Fourth,
there is the complication of how to proceed when several peo-
ple fail to take the required action-a serious concern since
lack of action is most likely to occur with groups." Can the
victim sue all those who failed to rescue him? Have they all
"caused" the death or injury of the victim by their inaction?
How does the court apportion any resulting liability? Fifth,
39. This is a question for criminal law as well. Cf. United States v.
Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("ITihe proper use of
the criminal law in a society such as ours is to prevent harmful conduct for the
protection of the law abiding, rather than to purify thoughts and perfect charac-
ter."); see also infra note 90.
40. Indeed, we believe that the courts should continue their search for spe-
cial relationships that justify imposing duties to rescue or aid.
41. Note that some of the arguments in this section may argue against both
civil and criminal duties.
42. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
43. See Dressler, supra note 1, at 983 n.54; Melody J. Stewart, How Making
the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding Crimi-
nal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 431-32 (1998) (reviewing em-
pirical studies documenting the social inhibition phenomenon).
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since tort law necessarily addresses the conduct of plaintiffs
as well as that of defendants, how the plaintiff got into the
perilous situation may affect the defendant's liability for not
rescuing. Sixth, even if a court were otherwise persuaded to
impose a duty to rescue, it might find retroactive imposition
of such a duty quite unfair. Finally, perhaps a criminal man-
date, with its exclusive focus on defendants, will be more ef-
fective in obtaining compliance.
Since no civil court has given content to a civil duty to
rescue, Vermont's well-known and typical criminal statute
will be used for purposes of discussion. The Vermont provi-
sion provides:
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be
rendered without danger or peril to himself or without in-
terference with important duties owed to others, give rea-
sonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assis-
tance or care is being provided by others.44
Any court considering imposing a civil duty to rescue
would need to address the issues that this provision ad-
dresses and would not impose more onerous civil obligations.
Since every proposal of a duty to rescue (whether criminal or
civil) is limited to mandating only "easy" rescues,45 the Ver-
44. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973). See also MINN. STAT.§ 640A.01(1) (1996) ("A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that
another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994)
("Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is
exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or
she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give rea-
sonable assistance .... ).
45. See supra note 1. Some proponents of a civil duty suggest additional
limitations. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mytho-
psycholegal Analysis, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 439, 519 (1994) (suggesting a
scheme for evaluating a duty to rescue in which ease of rescue is only one of six
factors). Is there any safe rescue these days other than pulling a baby from a
puddle? Even if the rescue appears to pose no obvious dangers, it may still be
dangerous. An apparently injured person lying on the side of the road could be
a trick to lure the Good Samaritan into a criminal trap. Even if the person is
truly injured, the situation may involve other hidden dangers. See, e.g., Walker
killed on 101 had HI, CHP says, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 6, 2000, at A3 ("The
Highway Patrol is looking for Good Samaritans who may have been exposed to
the AIDS virus when they performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and CPR on
a man struck and killed by a car Saturday on U.S. 101 in Windsor."). Of course,
the world is dangerous enough even when one is not involved in rescuing others.
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mont statute-with its exemption for danger to the rescuer
and for duties owed others-seems a reasonable standard to
hypothesize. With this statute as a backdrop, this essay now
considers the arguments against a tort law duty to rescue.
A. Personal Freedom
For some, personal freedom is a core issue. Some argue
that the government should never force citizens to take steps
to protect each other.46  Communitarians disagree.47  Apart
from disagreements over the nature of government and soci-
ety, some dispute whether a mandatory duty would stifle or
undermine the notion of altruism-and whether that is im-
portant for society. 8 However important this philosophical
For example, Ennis Cosby was robbed and murdered when he stopped to change
a flat tire on his own car. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Bill Cosby's Son Is Slain
Along Freeway, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at A14.
46. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
151, 197-204 (1973); Dressier, supra note 1, at 987-88 n.73. This area is ex-
plored at length by Peter Singer in PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed.
1999). Singer explores the situation of a man who "has invested most of his
savings in a very rare and valuable old Bugatti, which he has not been able to
insure." Id. The car will "allow him to live comfortably after retirement." Id.
The man is then confronted with a situation in which a boy will be killed on a
railroad track unless the man throws a switch that will veer the train onto a
siding where it will destroy the Bugatti. See generally Peter Berkowitz, Other
People's Mothers, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10, 2000, at 27 (reviewing two
Singer books and discussing this example). Consider also the argument of op-
ponents of Proposition 19 on the March, 2000 California ballot. The claim was
that if transit police were treated as other police, transit police would be em-
powered to order citizens to join a posse to chase a fugitive. This potential dan-
ger was enough to lead libertarians to oppose the proposition, whose main pur-
pose was to increase the penalty for killing transit police. See California
Secretary of State, California Voter Information Guide: March 7, 2000 Primary
Election, at 39 (visited May 2, 2000) <http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections
_bp.htm> (discussing the statement of Gail K. Lightfoot, past chair of the Liber-
tarian Party of California, and others in opposition to Proposition 19).
47. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where
Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 660-61 (1995); see
also Yeager, supra note 1, at 38-54.
48. See Epstein, supra note 46, at 200. Professor Anthony D'Amato recog-
nizes that making an act criminal destroys the altruism argument:
Once a law is passed, S will not be acting out of altruism but out of his
own self-interest in avoiding the criminal sanctions of the law. Thus,
the law has arguably destroyed the basis for altruistic behavior by re-
quiring it. However, the fact that a majority of the members of a state
might find it in their self-interest to pass such legislation does not nec-
essarily deprive any smaller class of people of the possibility of moral
behavior. If the behavior is morally required, then it should not be sig-
nificant that it be labeled "altruistic."
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point may be, we are unwilling to rest our argument on it.
Although we reject arguments that rely entirely on personal
freedom,49 we nonetheless reject the imposition of a civil duty
to rescue for other reasons.
B. Is There a Need?
There is no evidence that citizens are refusing to make
easy rescues. The oft-raised paradigm here is the baby who
crawls into a few inches of water in a puddle and might
drown. If citizens en masse do not rescue drowning babies,
one might well argue that some legal mandate is appropriate.
It appears, however, that drowning babies are rescued. De-
spite the lack of data, one can surmise that when the need for
rescue is clear and the situation safe, rescues do occur."
Those who propose a mandated duty to rescue must show
that failures to attempt easy rescues are a problem in our so-
ciety.
If the argument is that today's perils create a greater
need for intervention than in the past, this is an argument in
favor of reducing unjustifiable perils and educating citizens
about how to minimize or avoid these perils rather than re-
quiring rescue. Most contemporary assertions of a need for a
duty to rescue arise in the context of criminal conduct.51 Dan-
gerous situations involving ongoing criminal conduct raise
much more difficult questions for proponents of mandated
Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 798, 805
& n.30 (1976). Note that this also applies to a state in which civil law obligates
rescue.
49. Some are concerned that any obligation to rescue would deter law-
abiders from going to beaches and other places where rescue situations are
more likely to occur than to other (safer) places. See William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 119-24 (1978); see
also Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law, 88
GEO. L.J. 105, 108 n.12 (1999).
50. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., ABRAHAM M. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES (1964)(describing how Kitty Genovese was repeatedly attacked and then murdered
while her neighbors did nothing to help); Dressler, supra note 1, at 971-72 (dis-
cussing how Sherrice Iverson was raped and murdered in a Nevada casino
bathroom by Jeremy Strohmeyer while his friend, David Cash, waited outside);
Stewart, supra note 43, at 389-90 (relating how two men severely beat Joey
Levick and left him to die in a drainage ditch and then told several people who
did nothing to help Levick).
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easy rescues.52 Even such proponents recognize that today's
society presents physical risks that are much more common
and deadly than those existing when James Barr Ames pro-
posed his duty of easy rescue in 1908."3 In today's society, it
may be unrealistic to demand that citizens stop at an accident
scene in an unpopulated area, even if someone appears to be
seriously hurt and the situation has no obvious dangers.54
C. Civil Liability for Damages
Those states that impose a criminal duty to rescue im-
pose only minimal penalties.55 Tort law, on the other hand,
might award damages in death or injury-aggravation cases in
the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. This potential
liability suggests that tort law may be far more threatening
and burdensome for many persons than criminal law. The
law abounds in situations in which civil liability may be far
more onerous from a financial perspective than criminal li-
ability.56 For judgment-proof defendants, however, tort law is
52. Consider the potential liability in the Genovese situation if a witness
had called the police and had then shouted out the window that he had made
the call-to give courage to the victim and to try to get the attacker to depart.
What if the attacker quickly killed the victim and ran away? Might the victim's
estate argue that a jury should decide whether the caller was negligent to an-
nounce what he had done-that the victim would only have been wounded if he
had not shouted to the murderer? Might a jury find that it was negligent to
alert an attacker to the imminent arrival of the police?
53. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908); see
also, e.g., Jain, supra note 1, at 1200 (relating examples of Good Samaritans
being victimized by criminals feigning injury).
54. The ambiguity of the accident scene is a factor that a prosecutor should
consider before charging a criminal failure to rescue-whether or not the stat-
ute explicitly addressed that issue. In civil litigation, this issue may be raised
by pretrial motion but deferred until a trial at which the jury will be free to con-
clude that there was no risk. In addition, as noted later, see infra note 82, the
civil case will lack most-if not all-of the other criminal law protections, such
as the judicial tendency to narrowly construe criminal statutes, the burden of
proof, and the common requirement for a unanimous verdict.
55. See MINN. STAT. §§ 604A.01 & 609.02 (1996) (imposing a maximum fine
of $200); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 11-56-1 (1994) (imposing a maximum of six months
in jail, $500 fine, or both); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (1973) (imposing a
maximum fine of $100).
56. See, e.g., BMW of North Amer., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (con-
trasting punitive damage award of $2,000,000 with the state's $2,000 maximum
fine for the same conduct); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(contrasting civil award of $500,000 with maximum criminal sanction of fine of
up to $500 and prison sentence of six months). We strongly suspect that citi-
zens in Vermont who failed to rescue would prefer, if given a choice, to be prose-
cuted under the criminal law and pay a fine of $100 than to be exposed to tort
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essentially irrelevant, though the bite of the criminal law re-
mains."
D. Complexity of Civil Litigation
When multiple parties are involved, civil cases present
difficulties beyond those in criminal cases. Among these is
the determination and apportionment of liability among sev-
eral defendants. Again, the drowning baby paradigm offers
no complications. But a variation of the Sherrice Iverson case
would involve many complexities." First, there is possible
negligence by a father who lets his young daughter wander off
and play with strangers. In a survival action for the child's
emotional distress before her death, 9 some states would judge
the father's conduct by the reasonable parent formula. ° Sec-
ond, there is the battery committed by Jeremy Strohmeyer.
Tort law has recently focused on apportioning liability among
negligent and intentional tortfeasors.' Third, if the casino
had guards responsible for monitoring the area, their negli-
gent failure to protect an invitee must be considered. Suffice
it to say here that there is confusion and disagreement over
whether to apportion percentages of liability and, if so, how to
do it.
Only when the next defendant, David Cash, is added to
the mix, does the crucial question arise. Assuming a civil
liability for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. We are not proposing that
law violators should be given their choice; we are simply observing that what-
ever generic attitudes we hold toward the relationship between the two systems
almost surely do not apply in the rescue situation.
57. The usual claim that even a judgment-proof person has incentives to act
safely because of physical dangers, as in driving or crossing the street, is un-
likely to apply in rescue cases.
58. We refer readers to Professor Dressler's article for the facts of the actual
case. See Dressler, supra note 1, at 972-73.
59. Courts have allowed recovery for pre-death emotional distress. See, e.g.,
Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) (allowing
recovery for plane passenger's pre-impact fright); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d
777 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowing recovery for passenger in plane that was running
low on fuel over the open sea and was never seen again), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 801 (1977); Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989) (permitting recov-
ery from pre-impact fright in a car-motorcycle accident).
60. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971). To avoid complica-
tions of apportioning liability in some death cases, if a prospective beneficiary is
negligent we assume that only the non-negligent parent sues.
61. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) 1999).
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version of the Vermont statute is in effect, and that Cash
clearly violated it, 2 how should liability be apportioned
among the four defendants? How much liability can be ap-
portioned to the non-rescuer as opposed to the person who
carelessly allowed the child to get into a position of peril,
guards monitoring events in the casino, and the murderer?
Since most states have abolished joint-and-several liability,63
the apportionment issue is important. Depending on the per-
centage of fault allotted to Cash, he would be liable in some
states only for that percentage of liability. In California,
Cash would be jointly and severally liable for any economic
harm, but only severally for non-pecuniary harm.64 In a
situation as complex as this, it is doubtful that a lawsuit pro-
vides enough return for society or the plaintiff to be worth
adding the non-rescuer to the mix.65
E. Defenses
Whether the victim is an adult or a child, tort law must
address claims about the victim's carelessness or recklessness
in getting into a situation that required or appeared to re-
quire rescue. For example, what about a plaintiff who dives
into a river knowing that he does not know how to swim but
alerting those on the banks to his impending dive?66 Is this to
be compared with the defendant's failure to rescue or clumsy
rescue effort? Again, the courts are in disarray on this issue.6"
This may add still another party's conduct to the fault mix.
F. Retroactivity
Even if a court were inclined to impose a civil duty to res-
62. That is, if we assume that Cash was not in any danger from an angry
Strohmeyer. See Dressier, supra note 1, at 971 n.1.
63. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES 325 (6th ed. 1996).
64. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1430-32 (West 2000).
65. Further, there are subtle issues of causation with such a suit. Are we
prepared to conclude that all four actors "caused" the harm? This problem is
not unique to tort law. But the civil focus is on the damages allegedly caused by
the inaction. Again, although this is not the central argument against tort li-
ability, it is important to note that causation here is more difficult to find than
when defendant's car runs into plaintiffs. See Volokh, supra note 49, at 106
n.6.
66. See D'Amato, supra note 48, at 802.
67. Compare Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981), with Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1995).
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cue, it might be constrained by the retroactive operation of
the judicial process. A defendant who understood the law to
permit failure to rescue would now be informed that the court
has decided to impose a duty and that the defendant must
pay the plaintiff thousands of dollars. Although this can be
avoided by the use of prospective rulings,68 courts are under-
standably uneasy about acting like legislatures. 9 Retroactiv-
ity is unattractive in such a situation." Despite occasional
judicial threats to impose affirmative duties to act based
solely on foreseeability,7 the courts seem generally and
genuinely uneasy about expanding the range of special rela-
tionships that warrant such action, 2 and can be expected to
be even more wary about imposing such a duty on a complete
stranger.
G. The Relative Advantages of Criminal Law
How much is gained by creating a new tort with these
probable complications? Although this essay addresses only
questions of civil liability, and takes no position on criminal
liability, it is impossible to discuss civil liability without rec-
68. See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S.
358 (1932); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984); see also Walter V.
Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 631-41 (1967); Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Pro-
spective Overruling and the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1902 (1993).
69. Further, such judicial action would not be a case of "overruling" because
there is no prior decision to overrule. Yet, it is a situation in which the univer-
sal understanding was one way and the court is now preparing to move the
other way. One possible solution is a prospective civil statute. See infra note
141 and accompanying text.
70. Compare the unwillingness of most courts to reject the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, even where there had been no judicial decision explicitly
adopting it. See Symposium, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Con-
tributory Negligence: Should the Court of Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV.
889 (1968) (including comments by Professors James, Kalven, Keeton, Leflar,
Malone, and Wade on the Illinois Supreme Court's reversal of the Illinois Court
of Appeals' judicial adoption of comparative negligence); see also, e.g., Williams
v. Delta Intern. Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. 1993). But see Davenport v.
Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 508 S.E.2d 565 (S.C.
1998). The comparative negligence situation is not as strong as our situation
because the defendant in that case by hypothesis had violated a duty of care and
the judicial overruling, though a surprise to the defendant, could hardly be
thought to be an unfair surprise.
71. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976).
72. A similar concern exists in criminal law. See Dressler, supra note 1.
GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM
ognizing that most commentators focus on imposing a crimi-
nal duty to rescue. Aside from compensation, criminal law
can do virtually everything, and maybe more in the case of
judgment-proof defendants, while avoiding questions of ap-
portionment, victim fault, and unfair surprise. Moreover,
prosecutors, exercising their discretion, are far more likely to
screen cases and decline to pursue difficult or close cases than
are victims and their survivors.
It is no answer to say that the tort complications pale be-
side the social need to encourage the desired relationship
among citizens. They may pale beside the need for some legal
recognition of a duty to rescue. But if society wants to im-
press upon the public the importance of helping others,
criminal law is preferable to tort law. Tort law can cause fi-
nancial ruin to a defendant who has correctly or incorrectly
been found cowardly, or who negligently misjudged the level
of risk. If symbolism were the issue, the focus of criminal law
would be entirely on the person whose conduct society seeks
to change. This would leave aside the conduct of others, in-
cluding the victim-considerations that tort law cannot avoid.
It is a large step-one that this essay does not encourage or
support-from finding that a non-rescuer violated social
norms (and perhaps deserves punishment) to finding that the
violator should compensate the victim or survivors where the
non-rescuer played no part in getting the victim into the peril
and bore no pre-existing duty to help the victim.73
There is no reason to believe that the cluster of incentives
reviewed in Part II does not produce enough rescues to argue
against the need for civil liability. Among the more impor-
tant of these incentives are compensation for injured rescu-
ers; tort law's solicitude for injured rescuers, including tort li-
ability on those who interfere with rescues; and the protection
of rescuers against liability. If needed, increased or new in-
centives might produce more rescues."4 The law aside, public
73. To the extent that criminal conduct created the danger, recall that the
claim for compensation is even more attenuated, though not necessarily extin-
guished. See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998); see also
supra note 69 and accompanying text. Indeed, the criminal law seems so much
the better candidate for imposition of a duty to rescue that one might think the
only reason proponents of a civil duty have turned to tort law is that criminal
law usually requires prospective legislative action and tort law can be retroac-
tively created by judges.
74. Although earlier we recognized that some may find incentives inher-
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recognition and media adulation of helpful citizens, including
heroes, may provide compelling incentives for many citizens.
The foregoing analysis has assumed that the state had no
relevant legislation. As seen earlier, however, several states
have in fact enacted criminal obligations to rescue. Part IV
addresses the question of whether such legislation alters the
analysis of the tort duty to rescue.
IV. THE IMPACT OF A CRIMINAL DUTY TO RESCUE OR REPORT
Common law is, of course, affected by relevant legisla-
tion. This is particularly relevant if the common law question
is whether to adopt a duty in an area in which the legislature
has created a criminal obligation. This Part explores the im-
pact of legislation creating a criminal duty to rescue and the
adoption of legislation in two related fields-the reporting of
crimes and the reporting of child abuse.
A. Statutes Requiring Rescue in Certain Situations
1. Arguments For and Against Extending Criminal
Duty-to-Rescue Statutes to Create a Civil Duty
A handful of states have adopted criminal statutes that
ently inadequate, see supra text following note 37, we do not share that view. If
one finds current incentives inadequate we believe the first recourse should be
to consider other incentives. One candidate for added incentives might be
changing the common law rule so that those who attempt rescues that are not
required are held only to a good faith standard rather than the due care stan-
dard now in place. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1979). Saul
Levmore argues that courts hold the person who initially attempts to aid but
withdraws before completing the rescue liable not because he has made matters
worse, but because he can be identified. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue:
An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive of the Law of Affirmative Action, 72 VA.
L. REV. 879, 937-38 (1986). There are, of course, arguments against changing
the common law rule, such as concern about overeager attention seekers who
see the need to rescue though reasonable observers would not, or who cause
harm because of their unusually clumsy rescue efforts. Our point is that dis-
cussion of new incentives should precede discussion of coercion.
Of course, for an incentive to have any effect on behavior, bystanders must
be aware of the legal rules. There may be, however, some evidence that people
are generally aware of the legal rules regarding rescue. See Hans Zeisel, An In-
ternational Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAw 209, 210 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) (reporting the
results of study comparing surveys of university students conducted in Ger-
many, which has a Good Samaritan law, and the United States and Austria,
which do not).
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explicitly require rescue." If that statute is silent about civil
liability," the courts must decide whether the criminal duty
to attempt "easy" rescues77 changes the arguments for imposi-
tion of a civil duty. This section explores the effect of such
statutes on a civil duty."
First, proponents may legitimately argue that the statute
establishes the state's public policy favoring rescue. This re-
moves the argument that state policy prefers personal free-
dom to the saving of life. The legal vacuum that requires a
court to make decisions without legislative guidance does not
exist here because the legislature has expressed its prefer-
ence for rescue by enacting the criminal duty to rescue stat-
ute. 9
Second, proponents may correctly observe that the crimi-
nal statute removes any judicial concern that the court might
be imposing an impractical duty-assuming the court were to
frame the civil duty along the lines articulated by the crimi-
nal statute. The legislature already concluded that it is fea-
sible to criminalize failure to rescue. Furthermore, the pas-
sage of criminal legislation does not normally carry the
implication that the legislature rejected analogous civil li-
ability. In the absence of some reason to think that tort li-
75. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
76. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1.
77. See supra note 44.
78. Proponents of a civil duty to rescue might rely on section 874A of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which provides:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing
or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the
violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate
in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure
the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the
class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new
cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A.
As discussed earlier, however, a civil remedy may not further the goals of
criminal duty to rescue legislation. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text. Further, a civil duty is not "needed to assure the effectiveness" of the
criminal statute. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. Lastly, those
in peril may not be a recognizable class of persons. Section 874A is much more
applicable to the child abuse reporting situation discussed later. See infra note
125.
79. The impact of criminal legislation on tort duties has long been debated.
Compare Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Actions, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 317 (1914) (should have no impact), with CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT
MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 146-51 (2d ed. 1980) (may be relevant).
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ability would interfere with apparent legislative goals, the
court must consider whether to impose a civil duty as it would
in any other case."
Third, a plaintiff may also correctly argue that if the
court were to adopt the statutory elements in framing a new
tort, no defendant could legitimately claim surprise because
the obligation was already made clear by the criminal stat-
ute.' The usual notice problem that makes civil courts un-
derstandably reluctant to impose retroactive affirmative obli-
gations is absent here.
But what do these admittedly valid points show? At
most, the above arguments remove some impediments to rec-
ognizing a tort duty to rescue, but do not necessarily make an
affirmative case that the court should take that step." It is
important to recognize that although tort law has long used
the violation of a criminal statute to help define the content of
due care-it has done so only after a duty to exercise care has
80. Courts may sometimes conclude that the overall legislative scheme is so
intricate and balanced that it should be treated as a complete package, implic-
itly barring judicial imposition of additional duties. However, there is no such
complex scheme here. But see infra note 82.
81. This assumes that the criminal legislation was in effect before the fail-
ure to rescue that gave rise to the tort claim.
82. In fact, in one sense it can be argued that the legislation works against
the creation of a duty. Even though there is no elaborate legislative scheme
that signals a complete package, some aspect of the legislation may induce judi-
cial caution. The fact that the criminal statute sets the maximum penalty at a
fine of $100 may be such a signal. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). A
tort action for wrongful death or for injury aggravated by delayed rescue might
lead to liability for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more. Since this
would be a civil action it would lack basic protections that were implicit in the
criminal law enactment: the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and a unanimous jury. A court should think twice about whether the legisla-
ture's decision to impose a minimal fine should influence it to create a tort duty
that might impose massive civil liability. Perhaps the legislative goal was to
change attitudes toward mutual respect and assistance in the community, but
to impose only a symbolic sanction-at least until lingering public doubts pass.
A rational court might conclude that the criminal sanction argues against add-
ing a civil duty because the criminal sanction already reflects an appropriate
"total" governmental sanction.
Furthermore, Professor D'Amato worries that after criminal law has set the
appropriate sanction the civil liability may totally upset that determination: the
combination of criminal and tort sanctions where both can be effective might be
heavier than the society's judgment of what is warranted. See D'Amato, supra
note 48, at 810-11. The preemption argument discussed earlier, see supra note
80, is that the legislature wanted no more liability. The argument here is that




A more general argument against allowing the existence
of the criminal sanction to encourage the adoption of a civil
duty is the public-private distinction between criminal and
tort law. Some conduct is thought to affront the public inter-
est generally, and thus criminal sanctions are proper. Other
conduct is thought to improperly harm individual members of
society and properly be subject to damage actions. Of course,
some conduct implicates both areas.84 One state that has im-
posed a criminal obligation to attempt to obtain aid for vic-
tims in certain situations has explicitly barred holding an of-
fender civilly liable.85 That position also has scholarly support
in the rescue context. 6 Professor D'Amato justifies this result
by identifying the inaction as a "public wrong" subject to
sanction by society through criminal statutes: the victim
alone should be responsible for his or her injuries. The basis
for criminal liability was the anti-social act of not rescuing-
an obligation that does not depend on how or why the victim
got into the position of needing help."
After recommending criminal liability,88  Professor
D'Amato rejects tort liability for three reasons:89 (1) the prob-
lem of judgment-proof defendants; (2) victims who behave
carelessly because they know they must be rescued;9" and (3)
"more generally, imposing tort liability gives a monetary re-
83. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 36.
84. For example, the crimes of murder and rape implicate the tort of bat-
tery, arson implicates trespass to land, and theft implicates trespass to chattels.
85. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (1993).
86. See D'Amato, supra note 48, at 810-12 (advocating "the adoption of a
Vermont-type statute coupled with a statutory provision explicitly prohibiting
any private action based upon violation of the statutory standard").
87. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
88. The wisdom of criminal liability in these situations is beyond the scope
of this essay and not relevant to what follows.
89. See D'Amato, supra note 48, at 808.
90. Note that only someone who has opted to impose criminal liability can
use as an argument against civil liability the point that the defendant will be
punished under criminal law without giving any award to the plaintiff. We find
the fear of encouraging risky behavior much weakened by the fact that Profes-
sor D'Amato would recognize a criminal duty to rescue no matter how the victim
got into the perilous situation, and has noted that criminal law may be more
effective there than civil law. As Dressler notes, however, the reach of Anglo-
American criminal law is limited: "The penal law does not seek to punish every
morally bad act that we commit." Dressler, supra note 1, at 987. This limita-
tion also applies to tort law if the goal is not compensation, but rather changing
behavior.
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ward to risk takers and penalizes risk avoiders; such person-
ality traits are not role reversible, and hence the argument
that [rescuers] might be in [the victim's] position someday is
not persuasive."9' On the procedural side, Professor D'Amato
is willing to trust prosecutorial discretion to decide whether
to charge a crime, but is (understandably) unwilling to count
on similar restraint on the part of the harmed victim or that
victim's survivors.
2. Examples of Refusing to Hold Criminals Liable in
Tort
Criminal law is frequently used to deter serious miscon-
duct even though civil damages are barred to those hurt by
that conduct. The examples of perjury, attorney behavior to-
ward non-clients, and antisocial plaintiffs highlight the dif-
ferences between the two regimes.
a. Perjury
Perjury is a classic and non-controversial crime in the le-
gal system. Whether or not another person was harmed by
the perjury (for example, losing a valid lawsuit or being de-
nied proper medical treatment), however, the courts are vir-
tually unanimous93 in denying the victim civil relief. This is
not because the harm is too trivial for civil action or that the
conduct was not seriously wrong. Rather, the articulated jus-
tification for not permitting civil relief for perjury is that
courts want those who testify under oath to do so free from
any impediment to their total candor and honesty. Witnesses
should not be tempted to trim their testimony due to a fear of
being sued by those hurt by the testimony.94 This kind of ab-
solute privilege is a drastic device in civil cases, but it is also
91. D'Amato, supra note 48, at 808; see also supra note 49.
92. See D'Amato, supra note 48, at 810. Professor Dressler is concerned
about giving prosecutors this discretion. See Dressier, supra note 1, at 983.
Nonetheless, that discretion is far more likely to be protective than its counter-
part in the civil area.
93. See Spickler v. Greenberg, 644 A.2d 469, 470 (Me. 1994) (noting that
Maine is the only state that recognizes a civil action for perjury).
94. See generally Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000) (extending
this protection to a § 1983 claim that a psychiatrist who testified at a trial on
induced memory conspired with other trial witnesses to assure that their testi-
mony was consistent); Neidert v. Rieger, 200 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 1999).
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employed in several situations to ensure freedom of speech95
and freedom of action.96
b. Attorney Behavior Toward Non-Clients
In most states, one party's attorney owes no duty of care
to the other party.97 In these states, an attorney who lies to a
non-client or withholds crucial discovery materials causing a
non-client to lose a case unfairly faces no civil liability. As
one court stated in a case of an attorney who allegedly with-
held an essential document during discovery, "[i]f [the attor-
ney] violated his professional responsibility, the remedy is
public rather than private."98
c. Antisocial Plaintiffs
Despite the emergence of comparative fault, situations
remain in which the plaintiff behaved so badly that civil
claims are barred against the defendant who nonetheless re-
mains liable for criminal punishment. For example, a person
hurt while playing with explosives may be barred from suing
others who may also be partially to blame. The perceived se-
riousness of the plaintiffs fault bars recovery despite the pos-
sibly criminal nature of the defendant's conduct.99 This result
is even clearer in states that bar a reckless plaintiff from su-
ing a reckless defendant. °° The law's deterrent function is
manifested through the criminal law, and an "undeserving"
plaintiff is denied compensation.''
95. See SACK, supra note 32, at 8-1.
96. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 74.
97. See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§§ 7.12-13 (4th ed. 1996).
98. Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App. 2000).
99. See Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984). But see Ashmore v.
Cleanweld Prods., Inc., 672 P.2d 1230 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
100. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5-4 (3d ed.
1994); see also, e.g., Lewis v. Miller, 543 A.2d 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
101. But this will not explain cases in which the defendant is only negligent
and thus not deterred at all in a case involving a reckless plaintiff. States util-
izing modified comparative negligence bar these suits, but there is no criminal
deterrent. Denial is based on a rejection of the fairness of comparative negli-
gence where the plaintiff is more negligent or reckless than the defendant.
A well-known hypothetical illustrates this point in an even more clearly
criminal context. A person who has stolen asks a friend to chop off the offend-
ing hand. The friend complies-and is sued. Professor Morris argued that the
plaintiff would be barred because of the consent (not the theft). See MORRIS,
supra note 79, at 25. But he assumed that the defendant might still be crimi-
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Although these three examples are different, they sug-
gest some of the important differences between criminal and
civil law.' °2 Although the existence of criminal liability may
help the plaintiff overcome some of the barriers to tort liabil-
ity, it does not automatically justify the creation of a civil ac-
tion for anyone who suffered from that criminal conduct.
Sometimes the reason is to be found in distinctions between
the "public" and "private" nature of the wrongs, though at
other times a civil action may run counter to the tort goal of
deterring dangerous conduct."'
3. Criminal Statutes that Explicitly Anticipate Civil
Actions
The analysis is not altered if the criminal statute antici-
pates civil actions by setting the standard of care for law-
abiders. In Vermont, for example, the rescue legislation pro-
tects rescuers trying to comply with the criminal law by
shielding them from tort liability unless their acts constituted
"gross negligence."'0'4 One might argue that Vermont included
this bar to tort liability to encourage those on the fence about
rescuing even after the criminal law enactment.'0 It is more
likely, however, that the legislature was responding to the
perceived unfairness of demanding that a person act and thenjudging that action by traditional tort "reasonable person"
standards.' 6 The problem with requiring reasonable care
from coerced rescuers is precisely that the law has taken from
that person the freedom to decide whether or not to under-
take the activity in question. Tort law's normal approach to
"reasonable conduct" assumes that those who harm others,
because they are clumsy or of subnormal intelligence, may be
negligent even if they acted to the best of their ability. There-
fore, although jurisdictions vary regarding their statutory
protections, none asks more of would-be-compliers than a
nally liable for mayhem despite the consent. See id.
102. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAw § 1.3 (1986).
103. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
104. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (1973).
105. See Volokh, supra note 49, at 105-09 (describing a typology of Samari-
tans, including the "Legally Swayable Samaritan" who "would be bad in the ab-
sence of the duty-to-rescue/report law, but would be swayed by such a law's co-
ercive or normative effect").
106. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 32.
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"good faith" attempt to rescue.107
There is no basis for assuming that the Vermont legisla-
ture implicitly imposed a civil duty by stating the level of pro-
tection in a civil case. The civil section simply protects those
who comply with the criminal legislation against what the
legislature assumed would otherwise be the obligation of due
care. This part of the statute does not address the civil li-
ability of a person who does not attempt to comply with the
criminal law. Since the Vermont legislature was fully aware
of the uniqueness of its enactment and the lack of a civil
counterpart, 10 8 it seems unlikely that it would impose a civil
duty implicitly. Rather, it is more plausible to read the stat-
ute as leaving the duty question to the court. °9 There ap-
pears to be, however, no reason why Vermont should more
readily create a tort duty than a state whose statute is solely
criminal." °
107. See MINN. STAT. § 640A.01(1) (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b). But see D'Amato, supra note 48, at 811 n.47
(arguing that if the criminal law should require rescue, "one sees no reason why
a reasonable man standard cannot be applied to the rescue attempt. Why
should the law encourage bumbling or negligent rescues once the duty has de-
volved upon everyone to render assistance to an imperiled victim?").
108. See Franklin, supra note 25, at 53-54.
109. On the other hand, the existence of section 519(b) does answer at least
one additional question: when a volunteer undertakes a rescue and is thereafter
sued, what standard should be used? In that case, it would be hard to deny any
rescuer in Vermont the benefit of the "gross negligence" standard. If the duty to
rescue did not apply (because the person had an important duty with which the
rescue would have interfered or because there was risk involved), but the res-
cuer decided nonetheless to try the rescue, it would be implausible to make such
a person worse off than a person who was in fact obligated by section 519(a) to
attempt the rescue. Although the legislature extended this protection to anyone
"acting in compliance with section (a)," VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b), it would
be unreasonable not to protect to (at least) the same extent those who sought to
rescue without being obliged to do so by the statute.
110. Curiously, in at least one situation the existence of a criminal statute-
with or without civil provisions-might make it more difficult for a court to im-
pose a civil duty if the criminal law would not have required rescue. If the
criminal statute tells citizens that no rescue is required in a particular situa-
tion-because of a risk or because of an overriding important duty-a judicial
decision retroactively imposing a civil duty to rescue in these circumstances
might be thought to unfairly surprise citizens. In this sense, the enactment of
limited criminal liability may properly inhibit the imposition of a civil duty.
That is, if the Las Vegas events had occurred in Vermont, but the statute would
not have covered David Cash (because, for example, he showed that he risked
harm from Jeremy Strohmeyer if he intervened), it might be harder for a Ver-
mont court inclined to create a civil duty to do so than if the state had no crimi-
nal statute at all.
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B. Statutes Requiring Reporting of Violent Crimes
In addition to the states with general duty-to-aid stat-
utes,"' some states impose a more limited duty to summon
aid for victims of violent crime."' Although some reporting
statutes appear to focus on helping the victim,"' not one re-
111. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 794.027 (1993) (duty to report sexual battery);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (1993) (duty to obtain aid for victims of crime);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1990) (duty to report crimes to law
enforcement officials); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1 (1994) (duty to report crimes to
law enforcement officials); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.1 (duty to report sexual as-
sault); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (1998) (duty to report offense against child
or any violent offense); WIs. STAT. § 940.34 (1995-96) (duty to aid victim or re-
port crime). Note that victims of an act of God or persons who put themselves
in peril would not receive the benefit of these statutes. That is, a witness would
not be required to call for help after seeing a baby drowning in six inches of wa-
ter. If the witness saw an adult put the baby in the water would a call to 911
suffice?
113. The statutes appear to be geared more toward thwarting the crime and
aiding the victim rather than catching the perpetrator. The statutes mandate
reporting where the crime involves a victim who is suffering from or is in dan-
ger of physical harm. If the sole purpose of these statutes were law enforce-
ment, then there would be no such limitation. Some statutes are explicit in
their purpose, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 794.027(2) (requiring witnesses to "seek
assistance for the victim or victims"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6(a) ("Any person
at the scene of a crime who knows that a victim of the crime is suffering from
serious physical harm shall obtain or attempt to obtain aid from law enforce-
ment or medical personnel."), while in other statutes the purpose is implicit, see,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (requiring reporting to law enforce-
ment officials without explicitly stating that the goal is to aid the victim). In
either case, however, the goal of aiding the victim is apparent from the language
of the statute. Most of the statutes apply only to those who witness the com-
mission of the crime. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 794.027; HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-
1.6; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1; WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1). The statutes also generally contain a time frame
component: witnesses are required to report crimes that are in progress and to
summon aid for victims who are suffering. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-
1.6(a) (noting that the statute applies when the victim "is suffering"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-3.1 (describing that the duty applies when the crime "is taking
place"); WIS. STAT. § 9 40.34(2)(a) (addressing situations when a "crime is being
committed and a victim is exposed to bodily harm"). Furthermore, the statutes
generally require that the witness report the crime or otherwise summon aid
immediately. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 794.027(2) ("immediately reporting");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 ("as soon as reasonably practicable"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1 ("as soon as reasonably practicable"); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-37-3.1 ("immediately notify"); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1)(c) ("as soon
as reasonably possible").
The Nevada statute passed in the aftermath of Sherrice Iverson's death,
seems to be less victim-focused than the others. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 202.882 (Michie 1999). The statute requires the witness to report a crime that
she knows or believes that another person "has committed," not limiting its ap-
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quires that witnesses intervene directly, even where doing so
would pose no danger."4 Rather, the statutes require only
that witnesses call for help."'
Hawaii's crime reporting statute is remarkably similar to
Vermont's duty-to-rescue statute. The Hawaii statute is, of
course, limited to crimes and requires only reporting-other-
wise, the two statutes contain remarkably similar language.
Unlike the Vermont statute, however, the Hawaii statute ex-
plicitly prohibits civil liability for nonfeasance."6
Since most crime reporting statutes do not mention civil
liability,"7 courts must decide whether to adopt a corre-
sponding civil duty to report crimes. As in the duty-to-rescue
context, the existence of a reporting statute alleviates judicial
concerns about notice and provides an articulated legislative
policy preference for reporting over personal freedom.
Moreover, plaintiffs can argue that the duty imposed by re-
porting statutes is less onerous than that imposed by duty to
rescue statutes for two reasons: (1) the reporting statutes ap-
plication to an ongoing offense. See id. Furthermore, although the witness is
required to report the crime "as soon as reasonably practicable," the statute sets
an outer deadline of no more than 24 hours after the assault. See id. This pro-
vision further suggests that the attack has been completed and that reporting it
as required under the statute may help law enforcement personnel apprehend
the offender, but does nothing to help the victim. Of course, the fact that the
statute is limited to crimes involving minors may imply some victim focus.
114. For example, the statutes do not require that witnesses yell (perhaps
from a safe distance) to the perpetrators to stop, or to shout that they have
called the police, thereby alerting the perpetrators that they are not alone and
may be apprehended if they continue. See supra note 112.
115. Most statutes specify reporting the crime to law enforcement officials,
but at least one (Hawaii) also specifies medical personnel. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-1.6(a). Wisconsin requires that the witnesses either provide aid them-
selves or call law enforcement officials for help. See WIS. STAT. § 940.34(2)(a).
This, of course, does not require direct intervention, but rather allows it as an
alternative to calling the police for help. In many cases, however, the action re-
quired by general duty-to-aid statutes (like Vermont's) and duty to summon aid
for victims of crime statutes may in fact be the same. If it would be too danger-
ous to attempt to intervene directly to aid a victim of crime, "reasonable assis-
tance" may require only calling for help. This suggests an interesting point
about the other statutes: if a witness chose to intervene directly instead of call-
ing for help, has he or she violated the statute? There may be good reasons to
discourage direct intervention by witnesses who may themselves be injured.
116. Recall that this is Professor D'Amato's proposition: a criminal statute
that explicitly rejects civil liability. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
117. Hawaii and Wisconsin, however, are exceptions. See AW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-1.6(b) & (c) (providing immunity from civil liability for both those who
comply with the statute and those who do not); WIS. STAT. § 940.34(3) (provid-
ing immunity for those who comply with the statute).
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ply only to situations involving victims of certain crimes, not
all situations of peril; and (2) the witness need not directly in-
tervene or rescue, but rather only report the crime.
Even considering these differences, however, the exis-
tence of a reporting statute does not make a convincing case
for recognizing a civil duty to report. As in the duty-to-rescue
context, there is no demonstrated need for civil liability for
failure to report crime."' The oft-cited examples of Kitty Ge-
novese and Sherrice Iverson are so shocking in part because
they are so rare.
In addition to a lack of a need for duty to report civil li-
ability, proving causation may be even more difficult here
than in the duty-to-rescue context. To prove civil liability for
failing to report a crime the plaintiff must show what would
have happened if the witness had reported the situation to
the appropriate authorities "as soon as practicable.""' 9 In ad-
dition to showing that a report could have been made, and
that "as soon as practicable" would have been soon enough,
the plaintiff must also show how the police (or medical per-
sonnel) would have handled the report, how quickly such per-
sonnel would have responded, and to what effect."' Given the
many uncertainties inherent in this chain of causation, it
would be quite difficult to establish what harms, if any, could
have been avoided by promptly reporting the crime. Again, it
is unfair to expose a person to potentially ruinous civil liabil-
ity for damages resulting from a situation that he or she did
not create.
C. Statutes Requiring Reporting of Child Abuse
The command to report child abuse recognizes an under-
lying problem that is far more common than failure to rescue
and far more serious than previously acknowledged. Every
118. Given this lack of need, section 874A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS provides little support for a civil duty to report crime. See supra note 78.
119. See supra note 113.
120. Many questions remain unanswered in this situation. Was the victim
still alive by time the defendant should have called? How many other emergen-
cies were arising at around the same time? How would the 911 operators priori-
tize the call? What were the traffic conditions from the police station to the
site? Would the victim still be alive and in a survivable state when the aid
should have arrived? On the uncertainties of calling 911, see Hutcherson v.
City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998); Stewart, supra note 43, at 420; Jain,
supra note 1, at 1195 n.131.
1020 [Vol. 40
2000] GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM 1021
state now has some form of compulsory reporting obligation."'
Generally, these statutes require those who have knowledge
of, or reason to suspect, child abuse to report it. Some stat-
utes require "any person" with such knowledge to report it;"'
others apply only to health care workers.'23 Most statutes
protect those who report child abuse in good faith from civil
liability, others grant absolute immunity.2
Although there are no direct holdings addressing a civil
duty to rescue in states with criminal legislation, several
state legislatures and courts have confronted that very issue
in the context of reporting child abuse. Although some child
abuse reporting statutes explicitly provide for civil liability,"1
5
most statutes are silent with regard to whether someone may
be held civilly liable for failing to report abuse. Unlike the
situation in the duty-to-rescue context, a few courts have
found a civil duty to report child abuse."2 In J.S. v. R.T.H.,"7
121. See Caroline T. Trost, Note, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking
the CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 194-95 n.63 (1998) (collecting
statutes).
122. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403(a) (1996) (imposing a duty to re-
port on "[a]ny person having knowledge of or called upon to render aid to any
child who is suffering from [any injury] which is of such a nature as to reasona-
bly indicate that it has been caused by brutality, abuse or neglect").
123. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115 (1986). The Missouri statute im-
poses a duty to report on the following persons:
[Any physician, medical examiner, coroner, dentist, chiropractor, op-
tometrist, podiatrist, resident, intern, nurse, hospital or clinic person-
nel that are engaged in the examination, care, treatment, or research of
persons, and any other health practitioner, psychologist, mental health
professional, social worker, day care center worker or other child care
worker, juvenile officer, probation or parole officer, teacher, principal,
or other school official, or other person with responsibility for the care
of children [who] has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been
or may be subjected to abuse or neglect or observes a child being sub-
jected to conditions or circumstances which would reasonably result in
abuse or neglect ....
Id.
124. See Trost, supra note 121, at 196 n.73 ("Every state except California,
Alabama, Ohio, and possibly New Jersey, which provide 'absolute immunity,'
has chosen to implement 'good faith' reporting immunity provisions.").
125. At least seven state statutes mandate civil liability for failure to report
child abuse. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-504(b) (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(4)(b) (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.75(2) (West
1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.633(1) (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-207(1) (1993); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 420 (McKinney 1992); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 40-11-6.1 (1990).
126. See Ham v. Hospital of Morristown, 917 F. Supp. 531, 534-37 (E.D.
Tenn. 1995) (holding that, although Tennessee does not impose a common law
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the New Jersey Supreme Court held that when the defendant
knows or should know that a child has been abused, there is a
duty to take reasonable steps-such as warning others, if not
reporting-to prevent further abuse."" Although statutory
reporting requirements do not themselves create a private
right of action, as the court noted, they do not preclude it.1 21
In the court's view, these legislative attempts to combat the
problem of child abuse through criminal law evince a strong
desire to ameliorate the problem. 39 The court concluded that
criminal sanctions were insufficient to "stem the tide"131 of
sexual abuse of children and that "civil remedies will com-
plement statutory protections and further the legislative ef-
forts to enhance the protection of children." 2 Most courts,
however, have declined to find a civil duty to report child
abuse, whether based on the reporting statute or common
law. 13
3
duty to report or prevent suspected child abuse, Tennessee's reporting statute
creates a private right of action based on the physician's statutory duty to re-
port); cf Sabia v. State, 669 A.2d 1187, 1193 (Vt. 1995) (alternative holding im-
posing a duty in a case involving a claim of inaction by a state agency after it
received a report of child abuse, using the Vermont duty-to-aid statute by anal-
ogy).
127. J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).
128. See id. at 935; see also First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 915 S.W.2d
262 (Ark. 1996) (holding a physician's duty arises out of the Medial Malpractice
Act, which "encompasses a cause of action for failure to diagnose child abuse");
Eric J. v. Betty M., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 551 n.2 (Ct. App. 1999) (court, holding
that family members had no duty to warn others of danger of convicted child
molester, noted that molester's mother, who had once left her son and a young
boy alone in her house, had been held liable below and did not appeal).
129. See J.S., 714 A.2d at 933 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 874A (1979)). Note that the question before the J.S. court was whether to cre-
ate a tort duty, using the statute or otherwise. This is different from the situa-
tion in which a court uses the statutory criminal duty to find breach once a duty
has been established. See, e.g., Bentley v. Carroll, 734 A.2d 697 (Md. 1999)(holding that where duty existed due to a doctor-patient relationship, failing to
report child abuse in violation of the child abuse reporting statute constitutes
evidence of negligence).
130. See J.S., 714 A.2d at 930-31, 933.
131. Id. at 933.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Isley v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich.
1995); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Thelma D. v. Board
of Educ., 669 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist. of St.
Louis County, 637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Eric J., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
549; Freehauf v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 623 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Vance
v. T.R.C., 494 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 1998); J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind.
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The child abuse reporting situation may be sufficiently
different from both the rescue and the crime reporting situa-
tions that a different civil result may be warranted. First, the
need for child abuse reporting seems to be far more pressing
than the need for easy rescue. Child abuse is more pervasive
than failures to make easy rescues. It is done in secret and is
much harder to ferret out.' As a result, much child abuse
goes unreported and third party reporting is essential to ad-
dressing the problem.'3' Second, victims of child abuse are of-
ten unable to articulate their harm or even to contact police
or other officials. The children are innocent by definition.
Third, a duty to report child abuse-or just keep the child
away from an abusive person-infringes less on personal
freedom than does a duty of easy rescue. The child abuse re-
porting duty is limited to situations involving child abuse,
whereas the duty to rescue applies to any person in peril.
Further, the duty requires only reporting and not direct in-
tervention. This limitation makes it easier both to define the
limits of the duty (i.e., what it would take to discharge the
duty) and to comply with the duty.
Fourth, unlike duty-to-rescue or crime reporting statutes,
child abuse statutes do not demand that people meet possibly
difficult standards of reasonableness. The act of reporting
child abuse is not difficult to carry out and is not likely to
harm the child or the reporter, in contrast to the fears of some
potential rescuers and some potential crime reporters. None-
theless, it is noteworthy that all seven states that mandate a
civil duty to report child abuse also protect reporters against
being held liable for unreasonable conduct.
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1990); Borne v. Northwest Allen County Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989); see also Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the
reporting statute did not create a civil cause of action but expressly noted that it
was not addressing the question of a common law duty).
134. See J.S., 714 A.2d at 933 (noting that "ninety-five percent to ninety-
eight percent of child sexual abuse 'is hidden behind closed doors").
135. See id.; see also Trost, supra note 121, at 214-215.
136. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text. It seems implicit that a
court creating such a duty without an existing statute of any sort should offer a
comparably lenient standard. In a voluntary system, a bystander who is unsure
about his ability to acquit himself reasonably in a rescue attempt has the option
of simply doing nothing, thereby not exposing himself to liability. The immuni-
ties that the statutes provide attempt to encourage the bystander to get in-
volved by reducing fears that he may be exposing himself to liability. In a man-
datory system, however, that bystander cannot simply sit this one out; he must
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Fifth, the harm occurs slowly and over a period of time,
allowing the legal system a better chance to measure the
harm done by the delay. The rescue debate, conversely, fo-
cuses on a victim who is unharmed at one moment, but then
suffers serious harm or death in a very short time period.
The extended time frame and the repetitive nature of the in-
juries makes proving causation less of a problem in child
abuse cases than in the general crime reporting context.137
In sum, it may well be more justifiable to impose a civil
duty to report child abuse than a civil duty to rescue or a duty
to report crime.138 The ultimate test of whether to create a
civil duty of the sort created in J.S. v. R.T.H. may be whether
the goal of the criminal law needs bolstering and it appears to
need that bolstering in the child abuse area. 139
These examples of mandated conduct 140 show that when-
get involved. To the extent that many of the child abuse statutes apply only to
individuals who have a special relationship with the child abuse victim, those
individuals may already have a civil duty regardless of the statute.
137. Proving causation, however, still requires speculation about how the re-
port would have been processed and what intervention, if any, it would have
spurred.
138. There are, however, still some concerns that militate against finding
such a civil duty. As discussed above, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text, imposing a civil duty to report child abuse exposes a person to potentially
ruinous civil liability for failing to report. The penalties imposed by the crimi-
nal statutes are mild in comparison. Also, courts must always consider whether
civil liability would impair what the legislature thought was the appropriate
balance of duty and liability.
139. Contrary to the duty-to-rescue or crime reporting contexts, section 874A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts seems particularly on point here. There is
no doubt that requiring reports of child abuse is meant to protect "a class of per-
sons" and that the age and dependence of that class and the secrecy of the
criminal act suggest that tort law may be needed to further "the purposes of the
legislation" and "to assure the effectiveness of the [criminal] provision." Com-
pare supra note 78, with supra note 118.
140. There are other examples of such mandates, but some are far afield from
our question. Nonetheless, they do suggest that such coercion warrants some
level of protection from civil liability. In California, the legislature has consid-
ered background checks on prospective peace officers to be so important that
under specified conditions a former employer of an applicant "shall disclose em-
ployment information" when asked by an appropriate inquirer. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 1031.1(a) (West 1995). An employer's refusal to comply "shall constitute
grounds for a civil action for injunctive relief requiring disclosure on the part of
an employer." Id. § 1031.1(d). In return, the legislature granted the responding
employer extensive protection against civil liability. See id. § 1031.1(b) (grant-
ing immunity against civil liability "in the absence of fraud or malice"). A court
has increased that protection to absolute immunity. See Bardin v. Lockheed
Aeronautical Systems Co., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (Ct. App. 1999). Here, coercing
action that requires the revelation of information that the speaker may not wish
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ever legislatures address civil liability in these contexts, they
have taken steps to protect (at least to some extent, if not
completely) those who try in good faith to comply. This would
suggest that if a court created a common-law duty to rescue it
should not adopt the due care standard as the measure of
compliance.
Although the pressing situation of rescuing a stranger in
imminent danger of death or grave physical harm has under-
standably captured the public's attention, it has given rise to
criminal obligations in very few states and to civil obligations
in none. Although a civil duty to report child abuse may be
warranted, it would not support a civil duty to rescue or to
report crime generally.
V. CONCLUSION
The nature of incentives, of criminal duties to rescue, and
other mandatory criminal and civil duties to rescue or report,
all shed light on the main question: should there be a civil
duty to rescue? This essay has argued that the presence of
incentives might reasonably be seen as the right way to in-
duce the desired conduct, and that more incentives might be
considered. A criminal duty to rescue should not generally
lead the court to impose a civil duty, even though the exis-
tence of the criminal statute does remove several impedi-
ments to the creation of civil liability."' Tort liability is not
an appendage to be grafted onto criminal liability in order to
add "muscle." The situations explored in this essay demon-
to reveal-but compliance should not be onerous if the files and memories exist.
For our purposes, the relevant point is that again the tradeoff for coercion is
protection from some kinds of legal liability.
141. As suggested earlier, see supra note 68-72 and accompanying text, if the
state has no prior history of criminal or civil obligation to rescue, we believe
that, at the least, given the long-established common-law no-duty rule, a court
inclined to create such a duty should reject the traditional retrospective ap-
proach to tort cases. There is simply inadequate notice to law-abiding citizens
that they risk the loss of all their assets if they refrain from an effort to rescue
that a court later concludes should have produced a rescue attempt. The use of
a prospective ruling can ameliorate this concern. This is not truly a case of
"overruling" since by hypothesis the court has never ruled on the issue before.
This situation differs from the case of someone who behaves badly and then ar-
gues that it is unfair to change the tort rule retroactively. In the perjury exam-
ple, see supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text, if a court were to decide that
perjurers should no longer be protected against civil liability, a defendant's reli-
ance argument seems quite weak.
20001 1025
1026 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
strate the fallacy of assuming that tort law is necessarily "less
harsh" on defendants than criminal law.
Most of the mandatory criminal duties imposed on citi-
zens have no statutory or common-law civil counterparts.
Those that do have related statutory or common-law civil du-
ties involve situations in which the obligation being imposed
on the citizen is much more easily defined and reviewable af-
ter the fact (e.g., a report or a phone call) than in rescues.
In conclusion, tort obligations to rescue (though perhaps
not those to report child abuse) have not been shown to be
necessary. Society may conclude that incentives have not suf-
ficed and cannot be strengthened, and decide that some duty
is appropriate. If so, it should consider a criminal duty-the
duty that focuses solely on changing the behavior of those
unwilling to perform easy rescues, without regard to what
brought forth the need for the rescue.
